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Newman on Medicine and Morals 
James Gaffney 
The author is a professor of ethics in the Religious Studies program at 
Loyola University in New Orleans. 
The field of medical ethics generally, and of Christian and Catholic 
medical ethics in particular, after a long but tenuous history, has 
developed prodigiously in the last half of the present century. It has 
generated an immense literature, even more complex, which continues to 
expand and ramify impressively. Its subject matter has become an 
ordinary ingredient of general and popular, as well as of specialized and 
professional education. And , as with other disciplines which have come of 
age, it has begun to express a secure sense of identity and maturity by 
taking keener interest in its remoter history. Thus, for example, the four 
large volumes of the Encyclopedia of Bioethics . . itself an eloquent 
indication of the present amplitude of its subject matter, significantly 
include a 272-columns-long article on the general history of medical ethics, 
as well as substantial historical introductions to many articles on more 
specialized topics.' 
Among those of us who have taught medical ethics, some, at least, have 
become persuaded that not a few of its problems tend to be more 
essentially grasped in the simpler circumstances of earlier instances, or in 
the course of gradual development. As in other areas of ethics, this seems 
especially true with respect to matters of rather broad philosophical 
principle. 
My purpose here is to suggest that a small but significant place in the 
history, especially of Catholic medical ethics, might well be allotted to a 
writer whose chief fame derives from quite other fields of intellectual 
endeavor, but whose cultural stature is of that high order which warrants 
attention to even rather minor works on occasional topics. I wish to 
suggest further, however, that the work in question is of more than 
antiquarian interest, imparting a message of that basic sort which is most 
resistant to obsolescence. 
John Henry Newman's ill-fated enterprise in attempting to create in 
Ireland , at the middle of the last century, a university for Catholics, is 
nowadays chiefly esteemed as the circumstance which gave rise to an 
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acknowledged literary classic, The Idea of a University.2 The book we 
know under that title was produced by combining two earlier volumes, one 
first published in Dublin in 1852 as Discourses on University Education, 
and another published seven years later in London under the title Lectures 
and Essays on University Subjects.3 The latest of the writings included in 
the latter volume had been published separately in Dublin the year before , 
as Relations Between Medical Science and Theology, just after its delivery 
as an address to the students in the Faculty of Medicine at the new 
university.4 It was, in fact , Newman's farewell address to his Irish 
undertaking, being followed in a few days by his formal and final 
resignation of the university's rectorship . Considering the abundance and 
variety of both popular and scholarly writing about Newman, this address 
has been somewhat surprisingly neglected. Even that remarkably 
serviceable volume in which Rickaby indexed the standard edition of 
Newman's works, seems to contain no reference to iP Nor does it appear 
in the latest bibliographical volume listing secondary literature pertaining 
to Newman.6 
Influence Upon History 
The year in which Newman delivered this address at his newly-founded 
medical school was an important one in the history of British medicine and 
medical education. It was the Medical Act of 1858 which first undertook, 
by setting up the General Medical Council , to foster public standards, later 
imposed by law, for the training and practice of medical professionals. The 
previous half-century had seen a proliferation of unofficial norms and 
counsels for medical conduct, of which the earliest , influential in North 
America as well as in Britain, was Thomas Percival's Medical Ethics. 7 It 
was a time , also, in which professional collegiality progressively gained 
ground against the currently prevailing spirit of competitive individualism, 
giving impetus both to a collective maintenance of standards and 
prerogatives, and to the monopolistic control over the medical market 
which obtained until the middle of the present century brought in 
socialized health schemes. 
Newman's address was accordingly delivered at a time when there was 
much lively interest in moral reflections on the practice of medicine. 
Characteristically, however, the line of thought he pursued was by no 
means typical of the thought of his time, and focused upon an area of 
concern to which sensitivities are perhaps stronger now than they were 
then . What inclined Newman to develop that line of thought rather than 
more familiar ones were, I believe, two preoccupations which dominate 
much of his writing relating to the university project: first, the relationship 
between a university as such and its constituent departments of learning, 
and second , the relationship in a Catholic university of religion and 
theology to the interests of secular scholarship. The predominance of the 
latter preoccupation in his address to the medical students is indicated by 
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both the title he first gave it, "Relations Between Medical Science and 
Theology," and the one he afterwards substituted, "Christianity and 
Medical Science." The former preoccupation is more implicitly present in 
the address, having been developed already in a general way by the 
discourse published six years earlier, on "Knowledge Viewed in Relation 
to Professional Skill."8 
That discourse was essentially a polemic against the educational 
utilitarianism of John Locke, adopted in the early 19th century by a group 
of notable writers in the Edinburgh Review, to criticize Oxford's 
classically-based program as devoid of utility and socially frivolous. 9 
Newman defended the Oxford system as supremely useful. Its utility lay in 
a cultivation of mind that equipped its possessor to deal competently with 
any intellectual subject, and therefore to embark with optimal 
effectiveness on any course of subsequent specialization. The prime 
accomplishment of liberal education was to make minds capable of 
functioning with keenness and versatility. And minds which function thus 
are not only intrinsically valuable , but practically and socially useful. 
Newman was convinced that persons whose minds functioned best in a 
general sense made the best physicians, lawyers, and statesmen. He was 
also convinced that specialized medical, legal, or political curricula were 
not the best means for getting minds so to function. In his view, 
professional studies thrived when they built upon a liberal education, but 
they could not of themselves provide one. 
Closely related to Newman's opinion about the professional usefulness 
of liberal education was his belief that professional education was itself 
best carried out within a university as, in his day, it usually was not. 
In sayi ng tha t law or medicine is not the end of a university, I do not mean to 
imply that the university does not teach law or medicine. What indeed can it teach 
at a ll , if it does not teach something particular? It teaches all knowledge by 
teaching all branches of knowledge , and in no other way. I do but say that there 
will be this distinction as regards a professor of law, or of medicine, or of geology, 
or of political eco nomy, in a uni versi ty and out of it , that out of a university he is 
in danger of being absorbed and narrowed by his pursuit , and of giving lectures 
which are the lectures of nothing more than a lawyer , physician, geologist, or 
political economist; whereas in a university he will just know where he and his 
science stand; he has come to it , as it were, from a height, he has taken a survey of 
all knowledge, he is kept from extravagance by the very rivalry of other studies , 
he has gained from them a special illumination and largeness of mind and 
freedom and self-possession, and he treats hi s own in consequence with a 
philosophy a nd a resource , which belongs not to the study itself, but to his liberal 
education .1o 
Thus for Newman, the school of medicine, or other specialized faculty, 
gains from its situation within a university in the same way that the student 
of medicine, or of other practical specialties gains from his background of 
liberal education. It gains a breadth and suppleness of mentality which 
both stimulate and moderate its own proper pursuits . It is on this last 
consideration that Newman built his argument six years later, in 
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addressing the medical students of his own university. 
Letter to Irish Catholic Hierarchy 
He had written two years before to the Irish Catholic hierarchy that one 
of "four immediate objects to be compassed by the University" was that of 
"securing the moral and liberal education of the medical profession, a 
profession which can, of all others, be an aid and support to the parish 
priests in the country at large ." This was to be done by "establishing a 
medical school in Dublin, and in providing burses for students in 
connection with it."ll That formulation was designed, evidently, to 
commend the medical school project to the practical interests of a clergy 
whose own acquaintance with universities was meager, and whose 
educational philosophy was often pedestrian. Still, for Newman himself, 
the benefit to a medical school of being situated within the kind of 
university he envisaged, emphatically included its being exposed to the 
influence of theology. Nor was this consideration external to his argument 
for locating professional education in a university, for he had argued at 
length , in his first three Discourses on University Education, that theology 
is an essential component of liberal education. 12 
It seemed to Newman that the chief danger besetting the best elements of 
any profession was a spontaneous tendency to treat the proper interests of 
that profession as exclusive or overriding. What concerned him most were 
not unprofessional activities, but relentlessly professional attitudes. His 
moral message was not to quacks and mountebanks, whom he could only 
denounce in the same way their conscientious colleagues habitually 
denounced them. He was addressing competent, dedicated professionals, 
whose very assiduity was conducive to a particular sort of narrowness of 
mind . 
All professions have their dangers, all general truths have their fallacies, all 
spheres of action have their limits , and are liable to improper extension or 
alteration. Every professional man has rightly a zeal for his profession, and he 
would not do his duty towards it without that zeal. And that zeal soon becomes 
exclusive, or rather necessarily involves a sort of exclusiveness. A zealous 
professional man soon comes to think that his profession is all in all , and that the 
world would not go on without it.1J 
Newman goes on to illustrate this hyper-professionalism from a sphere 
where its manifestations are typically less subtle and more publicly 
apparent, the sphere of military professionalism. It may be recalled that 
the year when Newman addressed his medical school at Dublin, 1858, was 
the climactic year of Britain's wars of imperialism in India, during which 
the press had repeatedly drawn public attention to conflicts of opinion 
between the nation's political and military leadership. What Newman 
found instructive about these disputes was the fact that the military 
recommendations were , on strictly military grounds, usually persuasive, 
whereas it was on the quite different grounds of statesmanship that their 
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wisdom came into question. Newman could appreciate the obstinacy, in 
such circumstances, of a seasoned, skilled, and dedicated commander. 
How hard it must be for the military man to forego his own strategical 
dispositions, not on the ground that they are not the best ... but ... because the 
interests of the council and the cabinet require the sacrifice, that the war must 
yield to the statesman's craft, the commander-in-chief to the governor-general. I' 
Still, there could be no question in such a contention of who must finally 
give way to whom. Evidently, the most complete military success is not 
inevitably harmonious with the highest national good . Military victories 
can be political and moral defeats. And the task of professional soldiers is 
to do their military best only insofar as they are bidden to do so by the 
nation, through its government, in its just interests. 
Ethic Presupposes Norms 
Thus a military ethic must presuppose norms not only of how to behave 
in the course of a campaign, but of when to modify military efforts or 
suspend them altogether. In the case of the military, since the superiority of 
broadly political aims to narrowly military ones is constitutionally 
established, cases of insubordination can be disposed of without much 
soul-searching. But such reliably institutional provisions are not available 
to other, civilian professions, for which, nevertheless, similar problems 
arise, and must be solved more reflectively. 
That they arise for the medical profession seemed obvious to Newman. 
Just as the militarily right thing is not always the politically wise thing, so 
also , what is medically indicated is not always or automatically what, from 
a higher point of view, appears to be humanly indicated. For just as martial 
aims, interests, and values cannot claim supremacy in national life, neither 
can medical aims, interests, and values claim it in the life of humanity at 
large. No matter how important is the proper business of medicine, it is not 
all-important. 
Its province is the physical nature of man, and its object is the preservation of 
that physical nature in its proper state , and its restoration when it has lost it. It 
limits itself, by the very profession, to the health of the body; it ascertains the 
conditions of that health; it analyzes the causes of its interruption or failure; it 
seeks about for the means of cure. But, after all, bodily health is not the only end 
of man, and the medical science is not the highest science of which he is the 
subject. Man has a moral and a religious nature , as well as a physical. He has a 
mind and a soul; and the mind and soul have a legitimate sovereignty over the 
body, and the sciences relating to them have in consequence the precedence of 
those sciences which relate to the body.IS 
Newman adopted a curious phrase - and not a very felicitous one - to 
express the moral error to which he thought the medical profession 
susceptible. 
It is a certain sophism of the intellect, founded on this maxim, implied , but not 
spoken or even recognized - 'What is true is lawful.'16 
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What he meant is clarified by what follows. 
What is true in one science is dictated to us indeed according to that science, but 
not acco rding to another science, o r in another department ... And so what is 
true in medical science might in all cases be carried out were man a mere animal, 
... but since he is a rationa l, responsible being, a thing may be ever so true in 
medicine, yet may be unlawful in fact , in consequence of the higher law of mora ls 
and religion.. 17 
Thus, by "what is true is lawful" , Newman wished to express the idea that 
what seems feasible and advisable in the light of a particular discipline's 
basic premises and values, may seem, in the light of a more comprehensive 
philosophy, plainly wrong. The "truth" he refers to is not empirical or 
theoretical , but practical. It is the feasibility of a professional course of 
action consistent with professional goals. Thus, in Newman's sense, "what 
is true is lawful" means that whatever can be done, as long as it furthers the 
legitimate purposes of a profession, ought to be done simply for that 
reason. For Newman that is a fallacious principle because it ignores the 
possibility that the legitimate purposes of any profession may be overruled 
by other and higher purposes . And it seemed to him a fallacy to which one 
is especially prone whose education has been over-specialized, who has 
had insufficient opportunity to contemplate and appreciate the full range 
of human values, to become sensitive to those not cultivated by one's own 
profession, and to establish effective priorities accordingly. 
It may easily happen that the impressions made on a man's mind by his own 
science may be indefinitely more vivid and operative than the enunciations of 
truths belonging to some other branch of knowledge, which strike indeed his ear, 
but do not come home to him, are not fixed in his memory, are not imprinted in 
his imagination. And in the profession before us , a medical student may realize 
far more powerfully and ha bitually that certain acts are advisable in themselves 
acco rding to the law of physica l nature, than the fact that they are forbidden 
according to the law of some higher science, as theology; or again, that they a re 
accidentally wrong, as being, though lawful in themselves , wrong in this o r that 
individual , or under the circumstances of the case. '" 
Philosophically Limited Medicine 
Medicine, as Newman perceived it, is philosophically limited on both its 
theoretical and its practical side. Theoretically, it views human individuals 
as biological organisms, and practically, it seeks to preserve the lives and 
improve the health of those organisms. Thus it proceeds on a certain 
understanding of what human beings are, and on a related understanding 
of what is good for them. Obviously these understandings are neither false 
nor frivolous. But equally obviously, they are partial. Newman's point is 
that it is all too easy for medical professionals to forget they are partial, 
and that such forgetfulness can have morally damaging consequences. 
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A medical philosopher who has so simply fixed his intellect on his own science 
as to have forgotten the existence of any other, will view man, who is the subject 
of his contemplation, as a being who has little more to do than to be born, to grow, 
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to eat, to drink , to walk , to reproduce his kind, and to die . . .. His practice, then, 
is according to his facts and his theory. Such a person will think himself free to 
give advice , and to insist upon rules , which are quite insufferable to any religious 
mind , and simply antagonistic to faith and morals .19 
The remedy is not, for Newman, to depreciate medical theory or 
frustrate medical practice. Indeed , it is not to interfere with medicine itself 
in any direct fashion. Rather it is to try to ensure that a physician will be 
educated in such a manner as to be able and inclined to view his science and 
his art in the widest and truest perspective. 
It is not, I repeat, that he says what is untrue, supposing that man were an 
animal and nothing else: but he thinks that whatever is true in his own science is at 
once lawful in practice - as if there were not a number of rival sciences in the 
great circle of philosophy, as if there were not a number of conflicting views and 
objects in human nature to be taken into account and reconciled , or as if it were 
his duty to forget all but his own.20 
To become acquainted with such "rival sciences" with their conflicting 
aims and objects" and to learn to bring their various interests and claims 
into some rational order was, for Newman, the very point of a university 
education. That is why the location of medical faculties within universities 
seemed to him a matter of genuinely moral importance, because it 
discouraged the isolation of medical values from other human values with 
which, in the world as it is, they must come to terms. 
Newman did not, of course, concern himself with anything like the 
highly specialized casuistry which currently occupies much ofthe attention 
we pay to medical morality. But the more fundamental matter he did 
attend to has scarcely lost its relevance. A very significant part of 
contemporary moral concern about medical research and medical practice 
belongs precisely to the question of when what is medically indicated may 
be humanly contraindicated. Nothing, perhaps, illustrates that point 
more poignantly than the distinctively modern form of preoccupation over 
"death with dignity", with its implication that even so basic a medical 
interest as the preservation of life can, in certain circumstances, be dreaded 
as an indignity and almost as an act of violence. It is a phrase which 
eloquently typifies a profound human conviction that there are more 
important values even than staying alive and keeping alive. They are not 
values which medicine , as such, knows anything about. And insofar as 
medical practitioners do know about them, it is because they are 
something more than simply medical practitioners, and know something 
more than medical science. 
A Prophetic Anticipation 
Newman's €riticism of the view that "what is true is lawful" was a 
prophetic anticipation of that "technological imperative" which has since, 
on so many occasions, threatened to turn medical zeal into a kind of 
fanaticism and medical progress into a kind of tyranny. No doubt, such 
May, 1988 57 
dangers must be dealt with as they arise , and new policies and procedures 
evaluated on their separate merits . Newman offers us no practical 
substitute for unravelling, one by one, the intricacies of modern bioethical 
dilemmas. But he does remind us that all such efforts are doomed to futility 
unless doctors, or at least significant numbers of them, are persons of 
enlightened conscience, broad sympathies, and ordered values; persons 
who know there are things worth the sacrifice even of medicine's highest 
goods, things worth enduring pain for, curtailing life for , dying for. Such 
persons readily understand why some prices are , in the economy of human 
and moral values, simply too high for bodily comfort, health, and life. 
Newman, for his part, knew of only one institution on earth that never 
failed to acknowledge such priorities and insist upon them. 
The world is a rough antagonist of spiritual truth: sometimes with mailed hand , 
sometimes with pertinacious logic , sometimes with a storm of irresistible facts , it 
presses on against you. What it says is true , perhaps, as far as it goes, but it is not 
the whole truth , or the most important truth . These more important truths , which 
the natural heart admits in their substance, though it cannot maintain - the 
being of a God, the certainty offuture retribution, the claims of the moral law, the 
reality of sin, the hope of supernatural help - of these the Church is in matter of 
fact the undaunted a nd the only defender. 
Even those who do not look on her as divine must grant as much as this." 
Only in a university, Newman believed, could medical science hope to 
occupy both an honored and an ordered place. But only a university which 
did not exclude religion from the world of learning seemed to him capable 
of providing either the right honor or the right order. 
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